ABSTRACT
I . INTRODUCTION
Most recent studies on consumer demand behaviour have outlined the importance of demographic variables and regional effects in shaping demand behaviour. Since the 1980s (see Wales, 1980, 1981) considerable literature has been devoted to attempts o specifically capture the role of demographic variables in influencing demand behaviour. Such literature has focused on variables like size of a household, age and number of kids in a household in their analysis of consumer demand, optimal tax rates, formulation of child benefits, optimal government grants, besides other issues. Most of these issues are of importance and relevance in developed nations where subsidies and grants are used by the government as an easy and convenient tool of income redistribution. However, due to a variety of reasons (administrative, social and economic) developing nations are not able to use tools for income redistribution; they rely on indirect tax structure instead.
India, being a developing nation also uses indirect tax rates as an instrument of income redistribution. As a result the influence of demographic variables on a host of issues, including calculation of optimal commodity taxes assumes importance. This paper is an attempt in this direction; it incorporates household effects in the estimation of optimal commodity taxes for 16 states of India; thus giving due importance to difference in regional consumer behaviour.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Notwithstanding a large body of work, the empirical evidence on optimal commodity taxes is relatively recent and scarce for developing nations. Most part of the earlier literature focuses on theoretical aspects of deriving a set of sufficient conditions for optimal commodity taxes; empirical part came much later.
The initial empirical work on optimal commodity taxes was for a one-person case (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) , Fukushima and Hatta (1989) ,). The more realistic case for a many person economy (see Deaton (1977) , Harris and MacKinnon (1979) , Ebrahim and Heady (1988) ) uses the first order conditions derived by maximizing social welfare subject to a pre-set revenue requirement. In recent times, optimal commodity taxes have been estimated for a variety of purposes, including tax reform exercise. In a pioneering study by Ahmed and Stern (1984) for India, they used the estimated tax rates as a basis for a tax reform exercise. This was repeated for many developed countries (Cragg, Madden, Decoster and Schokarat) . Among developing nations such studies are relatively few due to the absence of a longterm and reliable, continuous data set.
However, owing to a rich, continous and detailed data set from National Sample Survey Organisation, many studies have been done for India relating to estimation of optimal commodity taxes and their further use in analysis of other issues. In a series of studies using the RNLPS (Restricted Non Linear Preference System) Ray focused on India. He concluded that optimal commodity taxes were non uniform across commodities and across rural-urban India. Other studies came to the same conclusion, but differed in terms of demand system used uses Almost Ideal Demand System(AIDS), whereas Srinivasan (1986) and Majumdar (1988) use Linear Expenditure System(LES). The only exception is Hatta (1986) who finds that a move towards uniform tax rates increases welfare. In Murty and Ray (1989) optimal commodity taxes were estimated and used to illustrate the possibility of marginal tax reforms in India.
None of the above studies relating to India made any reference to any kind of household compositional variables or regional differences. (All of them estimated optimal commodity taxes for India as a whole). The effect of household composition has still not been documented on Indian data to the best of our knowledge. This could partly be attributed to lack of data on demographic variables like number of kids, age of kids, number of male and female kids. Data relating to the demographic profile of a household has started being reported at a state level only since 1987-88(round 43 of NSSO). In countries like Australia and United Kingdom where such rich and abundant household compositional data is available on a longterm basis, numerous studies (Blacklow and Ray, 2000) have documented the role of household composition in influencing consumer behaviour and the consequent effect on optimal commodity taxes and other issues. The importance of regional differences in consumer demand was reported later by Meenakshi (1996) using the restrictive Linear Expenditure System. This was supported by Meenakshi and Ray (1999) using AIDS and its variants. Despite the documented importance of regional differences their effect on optimal commodity taxes has not been documented for India in any study.
III. BACKGROUND
The standard model for calculating optimal commodity taxes is outlined below: where R0 is set exogenously by the authorities.
The logic of optimal commodity taxes is based on maximizing the social welfare function subject to the government raising a preset revenue through them. The Lagrangean for this problem can be set as i = 1,2 …..n. h = 1,2,…..H Differentiating L with respect to the tax ti and , using Royʼs identity we can rewrite the first order conditions as follows:
where : Lagrangean multiplier that can be interpreted as the social cost of raising 1 extra unit of revenue : social marginal utility of income of household h. It is also referred to as the ʻwelfare weightʼ assigned to a household h. in simple words, it refers to societyʼs valuation of 1 Re. more of income to household h. A society which cares about low income groups will attach a greater value to an increment in the income of a poor household, compared to a similar increment in the income of a rich household.
Differentiating the social welfare function wrt prices, using Royʼs identity and assuming fixed produced prices, we have ……(2) where h = ∂W/∂y h . and is the social marginal utility of income for a household h. Assuming W to be additive in individual utilities, we have, where denotes the "inequality aversion parameter" 2 . Normalizing = 1 for a reference household (household 1), ……...(3) where v h ' = ∂v h /∂ y h is the private marginal utility of income of h. This expression implies that *h depend , via the vh ʼs on prices, household composition and income.
The demand system used in this study is the RNLPS form proposed by Blundell and Ray (1984) . Its indirect utility function can be demographically extended by the technique of linear scaling . The demographically extended indirect utility function is as follows:
We have used two forms of mh . In the first one m h =1+ d 1 (no. of kids in h) + d 2 (no. of adult males in h) +d3(no. of adult females in h). in the second one mh =1+ d1(no. of kids in h) + d2(no. of adults in h) Using equation 3 and 4, the social marginal utility of household h is given by:
The budget share equation for RNLPS is given as: where ( 0 < α ≤ 1) and (∑c i = 1)
The parameter allows for both non-linear Engel curves and non-separable behaviour. If = 1 our system reduces to the LES. Since < 1 in RNLPS, = 0 does NOT imply utilitarianism.
IV. DATA USED
This study uses data released by National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) which carries out surveys (National Sample Survey) in India. The National Sample Survey (NSS) is a multipurpose socio-economic inquiry of all-India coverage carried out in the form of rounds. For nearly three decades, NSS has been collecting each year, till 1973-74 and at five-year intervals after that data on the level and pattern of consumption from a representative sample of households in rural and urban India. It is the most comprehensive source of information on the subject-providing detailed, continuous and invaluable data over such a long period of time. The NSS collects detailed itemwise consumption data in value and quantity terms (wherever possible) for the last 30 days preceding the date of inquiry from the sample household by interviewing the head of the household. The survey period of each round of inquiry (which is one year) is subdivided into 4 sub-rounds.
This study uses data on urban India for 16 different states and, 9 commodity groups released by NSSO. The states include: Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orrisa, Punjab, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Kerela, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. The commodity groups are: Edible oil, Meat, fish and eggs, Sugar, salt and spices, Clothing and footwear, Beverages, Pan, tobacco and intoxicants, Fuel and light and Miscellaneous goods.
In this study, data from five rounds-28 th was used to yield a total of 970 sample points. . Price data has been used in the form of statewise and commodity-wise consumer price indices provided by Jain and Minhas (1991) and, Tendulkar and Jain (1993) . For the last round price indices were generated on a compound growth basis using growth rates provided in Tendulkar and Jain (1993) .
V. METHODOLOGY
This paper attempts to analyse the following issues: * Sensitivity of consumer demand behaviour to demographic variables.
* Sensitivity of optimal commodity taxes to regional variations (where variations are considered in geographical terms) * Sensitivity of optimal commodity taxes to revenue requirements * The redistributive impact of optimal tax rates.
In view of the evidence on sensitivity of optimal commodity taxes to departure from linearity assumptions of LES, we use a non linear demand system-RNLPS suggested by Blundell and Ray(1984) to analyse the above issues. This system has found wide use over time for Australia (Blacklow and Ray (2000) ) and India (Ray (1986a (Ray ( , 1986b ).
To test the sensitivity of consumer demand to demographic variables, we estimate a simple RNLPS (Model A) and compare it against extended versions that incorporate demographic variables, at all India level. Linear Scaling (Pollack and Wales (1980) ) has been used to allow for demographic effects. The demographic variables that were considered are: number of adult males, number of adult females and number of kids in a household.
Where m h involves no, of kids and adult males and females separately.
(Model C)
Where m h involves no, of kids and adults (males +females ) only.
The two models B and C differ from A as they allow demographic influences on consumer preferences. Between B and C the differences lie in the demographic variables used. Model B uses no. of kids, no. of adult males and no. of adult females in a household. Model C uses no. of kids and no. of adults (males+females) only. The difference therefore, lies in the gender specification of adults only. Ideally we would have liked to define demographic variables in terms of gender and age. But gender specific data for children is not available for the earlier NSS rounds. As a result, we have made no distinction for male and female children.
We have attempted to give due importance to regional differences by estimating RNLPS separately for each of the 16 states allowing for linear scaling. These demand system parameters for each state are then used to estimate the first order conditions (equations1a and 1b) at state level to arrive at optimal commodity taxes.
The evidence for regional differences was confirmed when we introduced a new variable for each of the 6 regions that we divided the states into. (details available with the authors. Refer to Meenakshi(1996) ). This new variable was then included in the estimable budget share equation of each good. The significance of this variable signaled that there are major differences in the consumption of different goods across regions.
Lastly, the first order conditions are re-estimated by differing the revenue requirements of the state. This allows us to analyse the direction of taxation/ subsidization on different commodities as the State attempts to mop higher/lower revenues. The calculated tax rates are used to estimate the redistribution implied by the optimal tax structure. This involves investigating the difference in the amount of indirect taxes paid by a specific chosen household before and after the imposition of the optimal taxes.
Following Sah (1983) the public revenue constraint is ∑ T h = 0 where T h is the total indirect tax paid by household h for all commodities used. This implies that all the revenues generated are by taxing some households and subsidizing some other set of households. The constraint also implies that the tax revenue generated is used only for redistributive purposes by the government. Let ʻlʼ be the worst household in the economy. Also let Il denote the hypothetical payment to household l before the tax imposition such that the household is indifferent between receiving Il or paying the new prices(that include the new tax rate),then ). The numerator denotes the expenditure at pre-tax prices to achieve post-tax welfare. The denominator is the money income in the pre-tax period or E l . This can also be expressed as I l / E l = W l -1. If I l / E l > 0 then W l > 1: the welfare of worst household has improved in the post-tax scenario-taxes have led to redistribution in the economy. In other words, such a household has received a net tax subsidy on its total purchases. A part of this subsidy causes his real income to increase, the rest goes as dead weight loss. Sah (1983) goes on to describe the ceiling on possible redistribution in terms of budget shares also. Specialising the above concepts for a RNLPS demand system Ray (1986c) has attempted a quantification of the redistributive role of indirect taxation using tax rates. He uses the expenditure function along with the aggregate revenue constraint to derive formulae that quantify redistibution as follows:
The logic of the above formula can be easily seen if we α= 1. This reduces the system to Linear Expenditure System. Then E* = ∑ h E h / H or average expenditure of all the households in the sample. Then
To improve the welfare of the worst-off household, -T l / E l >0, or we need E*< E l . In other words for any household below the average household, indirect taxation acts as a redistributive mechanism. In the Indian context, as in most developing economies indirect taxation is relied upon as a major source of revenue, which modifies the public budget to ∑ T h -d where d >0 is the tax revenue from indirect taxes.
The redistribution implied by the optimal tax rates can then be expressed as:
VI. RESULTS
These can be divided into many parts
• Analysis of the data in terms of budget shares.
• Estimates of RNPLS at all India level.
• Estimates for RNLPS for different states
• Estimates of optimal tax rates at state level for different levels of revenue and different welfare weights.
• Measurement of the income redistribution (if any) implied by our tax rates.
VI. A BUDGET SHARE ANALYSIS
As a first step, we calculate weighted budget shares. Table 2 and 3 present budget shares of two different kinds. The former brings out the importance of income in deciding where the incremental income will be spent. The latter focuses on the influence of family size/ no. of kids on the spending patterns. Table 2 presents estimates of marginal budget shares of different commodities in each state for the 50th Round (1993-94) , for three different households-richest, poorest and average. Note that for RNLPS, MBS depends critically on the value of a. These results amply demonstrate the inadequacy of using an average value of income in reflecting the actual demand response to incremental income. In line with common beliefs, MBS of a richer family will be lower than that of a poorer one, for basic goods like food, fuel, spices; the opposite holds true for miscellaneous goods.
Next, the role of household demographic variables in a householdʼs budget is considered explicitly. Common sense dictates that consumption patterns of a household are influenced mot only by income levels, but also by the size of the family. To check such logic, Table 3a provides budget shares of different goods according to no. of kids for 1993-94 (Round 50) on an all India basis. As expected the budget share of food, spices, fuel rises with the no. of kids. On the other end, the share of miscellaneous goods, meat, and clothing decreases. This is logical; clothes tend to get handed over from the eldest to the youngest; meat is still not a basic food item. Surprisingly, the share of pan and intoxicants rises despite rise in the no. of kids. This is a reflection of the importance of this item in a householdʼs budget. A similar pattern is revealed in Table 3b Table 4 provides the values of Log L for models A ,B and C along with the no. of parameters in each. Clearly, the models incorporating demographic variables perform better. Between the two representations of household characteristics , B is better and has been used in state level estimation of demand behaviour. 
VI.B DEMAND YSYTEM ESTIMATES

VI.C OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAX RATES
Based on these parameters, we are able to derive the optimal tax rates by solving the first order conditions. Tables 6a and 6b provide tax rates are provided at two levels of inequality aversion parameter (.01 and 5.0), and two revenue levels (18% and 30% of total incomes of households included in the data). The results can be interpreted as follows: a value of 0.35 implies that if price of cloth is 1 Re. then a tax of 35 paisa must be levied at the optimum. A negative value would imply a subsidy. Items like food, spices, fuel, attract a subsidy reflecting on their necessity in a household.
A cursory glance at each these tables reveals considerable non uniformity of tax rates across goods and more importantly, across states. Not only do the absolute values of optimal tax rates vary across states for any chosen good at chosen levels of revenue and inequality aversion parameter but, some states demand a tax on the good, whereas another some demand a subsidy on the same good. This implies that a good cannot be uniformly treated as a taxable/subsidized good. This confirms that optimal tax rates over broad geographical regions/ all India level have little relevance.
Next we compare tables 6a and 6b to reveal the reaction of optimal tax rates to an increase in revenue requirement, keeping the inequality aversion parameter same. One possible reaction could be that the higher revenues are generated by uniformly increasing tax rates/ reducing subsidy rates on all goods. This is indeed the case for most states( eg Rajasthan). But there are also some exceptions for eg, in Jammu & Kashmir, as revenue required rises the tax rate on edible oil does not rise, in West Bengal the subsidy on spices rises even though greater revenues are required. It can be argued that such goods are essential in every householdʼs budget irrespective of income. Therefore, such goods should not attract higher taxes, despite the need for more revenues. We refer to these goods as "everymanʼs goods". Besides such state specific and commodity specific cases, there is one state where such exceptions are the rule-Bihar. Here higher revenues are generated by a changing the mix of taxed and subsidised goods. It seems logical to argue that the tax rates are already very high compare to other states. As a result when higher revenues are required, they are not generated by a uniform rise in tax rates on all goods. This state generates higher revenues by changing the overall mix of tax and subsidy rates; this may involve a fall in certain tax rates/a rise in subsidy rates. These observations are reinforced when we compare the two tables with the inequality aversion parameter at Rawlsian levels of 5.0.the list of everymanʼs goods rises when inequality aversion parameter is higher. This implies that when the social consideration to poorer sections rises, more and more goods become essential to a household budget. In some cases like food in Orrisa, taxes are replaced by a subsidy even though higher revenues are needed. Thus, our results show that the State satisfies the higher revenue demand by making appropriate changes in the tax/subsidy rates on different goods-keeping in mind that everymanʼs goods should not be taxed at higher rates. Optimality dictates that the State does not raise tax rates across the board; especially when the inequality aversion parameter is higher, the mix of tax/ subsidy rates witnesses radical changes in response to higher revenues.
These tables can be compared again to examine the effect of rising inequality aversion parameter on optimal tax rates, for given levels of revenues. Since a rise in inequality aversion parameter signals greater weightage to the poorer sections it is reasonable to argue that as inequality aversion parameter rises taxes on goods consumed by the richer sections of society should be raised; subsidies on goods that form a major part of poor householdʼ s budget must be increased. We refer to the latter as " poormanʼs goods". For eg, food is a broad commodity group which attracts a higher subsidy in most states as the inequality aversion parameter rises from 0.01 to 5.0. spices and fuel also fall in this category. On the other hand, miscellaneous goods call a tax hike; it is safe to assume that these are more important to a rich man. These results are generally sensible, except for some exceptions. To illustrate, in Gujarat and Haryana optimal tax rates are nominally higher for food when inequality aversion parameter rises. Some of these cases can be attributed to specific reasons like the overall well being/ richness of a state or specific consumer demand pattern. In an earlier study (Bhatnagar) it was shown that at all India urban level, optimal tax rates on food do fall as the weightage to a poorer household rises. This reiterates the importance of differences in demand patterns across states, the differences are getting reflected in the optimal tax rates calculated at different levels of the inequality aversion parameter. Tables 7a and 7b provide evidence of the role of indirect taxes as a tool for redistribution. The redistribution implied by the optimal tax rates was determined at different levels of the inequality aversion. The calculations were performed on 3 hypothetical households -one, the poorest household in the sample; two, the average household; three, the household that gets half the average income of all households in our sample. A negative reported value for a household implies that this household has to pay some amount of taxes; there is no real gain in real income due to the imposition of optimal taxes. For any household to gain, the reported value must be positive. At the margin -Th / Eh = 0 . this is possible when E * = Eh . Tables 7a and 7b show a negative value for most states, pointing at the limited/ ineffective role of indirect taxes as a tool for redistribution. There are two exceptions to this observation-Gujarat and Haryana. It can also be seen that as the importance of the poorer households rises, the amount of tax too be paid by any of the chosen household reduces in some states like Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Orrisa, UP and West Bengal, as expected. This is a positive sign although the households still do not benefit as they still pay a tax, rather than receive a real income at the optimal tax rates. Our calculations show that for any household to benefit, its income (E *) must be extremely low in all states-the value of this income is as low as Re1 -Re2. Thus, the scope of indirect taxes as a tool for redistribution seems limited in India.
VI.D REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT OF TAXES
VII. CONCLUSION
Our study is an attempt to study the effects of regional variation and demographic variables on consumer demand behaviour, through their manifestation on optimal tax rates. This has been done by treating each of the chosen 16 Indian states separately for the purposes of demand system estimation. We have used the Restricted Non Linear Preference System, while incorporating demographic variables in it through the technique of scaling.
Our results are in line with those of earlier studies in terms of non uniformity of optimal tax rates. The results also reinforce our hypothesis that the tax rates are heavily influenced by demand patterns. The tax rates are non uniform across commodities and across states. The sensitivity of tax rates to different revenues levels and the choice of inequality aversion parameter has been amply demonstrated. It can be argued that the reaction of optimal tax rates to changes in these parameters is not uneven across goods and even varied across states. Figures suggest that there is a unique mix of taxed/ subsidsed goods along with the respective rates specific to a chosen level of social inequality and revenues. Finally, the role of indirect taxes as a tool for redistribution of income is limited in most states
End Notes
1 The values on h are derivable from the consumer expenditure surveys as they involve only expenditure levels of different households.. If ε>0, β h <1 so that any increment to expenditure is more valuable to the poor household 1 than to household h.
2 Different values to ε can be assigned by a social planner, which have different meanings A value of 1 to ε says that a marginal unit to household h is worth half as much as a marginal unit to household 1 if the former makes twice the expenditure made by household 1. A value of above 5 to ε would imply a Rawlsian social welfare function, where only the welfare of the poorest is considered.
Briefly then, higher is the value of ε, the aversion (dislike) for inequality is higher. The tax planner can express desired levels of inequality in the system by specifying ε value while setting taxes, as it represents the preference accorded to the lower income households vis-à-vis the richer households. The first row for each state is for inequality aversion parameter = 0.01; the second row is for inequality aversion parameter =5.0 The first row for each state is for inequality aversion parameter = 0.01; the second row is for inequality aversion parameter =5.0
TABLE 7a: MEASUREMENT OF INEQUALITY:VALUES OF T/E
(REVENUE = 18%) inequality aversion parameter = 0.01 inequality aversion parameter=5.0
Household 1 refers to the household with the lowest income in the sample Household 2 refers to the household with half the average income in the sample Household 1 refers to the household with the average income in the sample
TABLE 7b: MEASUREMENT OF INEQUALITY:VALUES OF T/E
(REVENUE = 30%) inequality aversion parameter = 0.01 inequality aversion parameter=5.0
